Best case for and against Ukranian aid?
by FL_Irish (2024-02-20 09:58:41)
Cannot Reply Return to Political

The NYT's Ross Douthat and the National Review's Michael Brendan Dougherty (two writers who I generally respect) separately wrote pieces on the best case for (Douthat) and against (Dougherty) additional aid to Ukraine.

Both seem to take as their starting point the belief that Ukraine is not capable of "winning" the war if winning is defined to mean pushing Russia back to prewar borders. Douthat argues that additional aid puts Ukraine in a stronger position to negotiate a more favorable end to the war. Dougherty argues that the best time for negotiations has been missed (to which I ask - but couldn't Ukraine's negotiating position continue to get even worse?), and that additional aid further commits American resources and credibility to a cause that we lack the will to see through to a positive outcome.

Are Douthat and Dougherty correct that Ukraine "winning" the war is off the table? If so, is Douthat right about the purpose of aid being to put Ukraine in a stronger position to negotiate a more favorable outcome?

Douthat's piece linked below.



From the American perspective, the best case is strategic,
by novadamer  (2024-02-20 10:49:03)     cannot delete  |  Edit  |  Return to Board  |  Ignore Poster   |   Highlight Poster  |   Cannot reply

not operational. Ukraine probably can't "win" in any meaningful sense. Last season's failed counteroffensive showed they lack key capabilities AND the doctrine/training to exploit them. That takes years, and is almost impossible to pull off while fighting a war. Russia meanwhile has a slow, bloody approach which they seem to be managing to implement.

Our support demonstrates commitment at a perilous time when nearly ALL of Europe sees the same threat: Russia. If we are seen as leading at this time, we garner benefits for decades to come (in Europe and elsewhere). If we are seen as shirking the role of leader, other consequences follow. Some observers seem to forget how much the US benefited from the rules-based international order it (largely) built after WWII. Before that, the notion of picking a fight or dominating a neighboring country was the norm; after that, it became morally unacceptable and practically actionable. This allowed the rule of law and international commerce to flourish, all to our advantage. That international order is now in question due to Putin.

Our strategic interest is in re-establishing our global leadership, which can be done even with a rump Ukrainian state. Meanwhile, our billions serve to keep Russia engaged so much so that it cannot seriously threaten other NATO states. That does mean we have an interest in Ukraine even post-war, as helping it evolve into a rules-based, responsible actor is part of the deal. But we can demand Europe play a greater role in that regard.

So do we spend billions on this objective? In my opinion, yes. Is it possible that money will be wasted? Operationally, perhaps, as Ukraine may never regain the lost territory and may have to settle with Russia. Strategically, no, as the money demonstrates our leadership, without costing a single American life.

Ukraine tried to do a Western combined arms
by 88_92WSND  (2024-02-20 20:53:37)     cannot delete  |  Edit  |  Return to Board  |  Ignore Poster   |   Highlight Poster  |   Cannot reply

assault without all the pieces needed for such an assault. What is galling, though, is looking at what they did do with the penny packet deliveries of systems the West did provide. The HIMAARS, Storm Shadow, PATRIOT, Gepard. All had outsized impacts on the conflict relative to the numbers deployed. But they were piecemeal. It's almost as if we want to push, but not TOO hard...to not be seen as the reason for victory in terms of equipment. And since the Ukrainians have killed off all the stupid generals, the Russians will eventually grind Ukraine down. We missed the window to make a difference with equipment deliveries.
Our response has been shameful, and likely catostrophic
by Brahms  (2024-02-21 10:23:53)     cannot delete  |  Edit  |  Return to Board  |  Ignore Poster   |   Highlight Poster  |   Cannot reply

We'll be sure to wring our hands, though, and impose more sanctions when tens of thousands of Ukrainian children are again shipped off to Mother Russia, etc., etc.
We were slow to provide aid in volume, including F-16s. *
by Brahms  (2024-02-20 11:00:15)     cannot delete  |  Edit  |  Return to Board  |  Ignore Poster   |   Highlight Poster  |   Cannot reply

Ukraine could win, but nobody wants to help with that.
by OITLinebacker  (2024-02-20 10:13:06)     cannot delete  |  Edit  |  Return to Board  |  Ignore Poster   |   Highlight Poster  |   Cannot reply

Properly funded and supplied with a full arsenal (not limited to short-range or outdated gear), they would win in a few years (the time for full training on the gear). The reason why they can't/wont win otherwise is that they just don't have enough offensive weapons or air superiority enough to really take the war to the Russians. They've only ever made limited strikes into any Russian targets in Russia proper. The US/NATO has held back because of Putin's threats of escalation.

Ukraine can't/won't win alone, but that doesn't mean they shouldn't be helped. It's not a sunk cost yet, but the better bet to me would be for them to return to their original borders as it would give them a better chance to eventually re-pay all of the aid. The average US taxpayer gets nothing if Ukraine loses but has a chance of getting some of the aid repaid if they win.
My understanding is that the military aid we give
by Brahms  (2024-02-20 10:59:30)     cannot delete  |  Edit  |  Return to Board  |  Ignore Poster   |   Highlight Poster  |   Cannot reply

...largely comes in the form of vacating old stock, along with allocations for jobs in the US to restock.

In the interim, we learn a lot about Russian capes (while weakening Russia), and get intel on new tactics.


The costs for not supporting Ukraine are grave (in no particular order):

1. an emboldened genocidal and revanchist Putin who only responds to strength, who would be even better positioned to weaponize food and oil and sew asymmetric warfare and de-stabilization efforts throughout the world.

2. a Ukraine that will be surely raped as a result of a major loss.

3. loss of US credibility in the eyes of US allies.

4. an emboldened China, who is even more long-term oriented than Putin, who would take note of America's appetite to staying the course in the face of blatant aggression.

5. an emboldened China who would step in to support on-the-fence allies who are unsure of US's willpower and direction.

6. more broadly, a disrupted rules-based / multipolar world order, [something about the 1980's calling and bringing their foreign policy back with a larger and more unhinged axis of evil].